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Abstract 
Institutional development has attracted more attention in the past two decades. However, 
institutional theory finds itself in a pre-consolidated phase and there are many theoretical and 
methodological challenges. One is to respond to the question whether institutional change is a 
spontaneous evolutionary or a deliberately designed process or a combination of the two. 
Another question concerns the interaction between technological innovations, changes in 
institutional arrangements and changes in the institutional environment in the dynamics of 
processes of institutional development. This links to another key question concerning the 
synchronicity in or co-evolution of institutional change processes at various levels and in 
various public and private domains. Institutional innovation rarely concerns one single 
institution but normally concerns bundles of public and private order institutions created at 
various levels.  
This paper researches how a common institutional need to develop institutional arrangements 
for rural collective action in order to enable small farmers to participate in newly created 
export chains, each with its own technological requirements and in different contexts leads to 
different institutional arrangements and outcomes. By comparing two cases, the paper seeks 
to unravel which factors and actors play what roles and how these explain differences in the 
process of institutional development and in that way to arrive at a better understanding of 
local institutional change. 
After a review of literature and the elaboration of a framework to answer the above 
questions, the paper presents a bird’s eye views of the two case studies. The first refers to the 
introduction of new apicultural technologies in the North West of Uganda and the second 
relates to the introduction of high value horticulture exports crops in the North of Peru. The 
final section examines the main commonalities and differences in institutional development 
and makes an attempt to respond to the main questions formulated above.  
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1 Introduction 
Since the late eighties, institutions have been recognized as playing an important role in 
economic development. It began with a critique of structural adjustment policies which 
centred too much on ‘getting the prices’ right, rather than on ‘getting the institutions right’. 
Since the nineteen nineties theorizing about institutions has taken considerable leaps forward 
but still finds itself in a pre-consolidated stage and there are many theoretical and 
methodological challenges. Most attention has been given to influence of particular 
institutions on economic development and not on the reverse causality. Chang (2010) has 
made this point most effectively. Economic development also changes institutions as it gives 
rise to new agents and activities that demand new kinds of institutions; the wealth created in 
the process demands institutional change towards more accountability and transparency but 
also makes institutional change affordable.  
A methodological challenge of comparative research in this regard is not to focus on an a-
priori defined specific nominal institution but to focus on a common institutional need, which 
may give rise to distinct institutional solutions in distinct contextual settings (Maseland, 
2011). In that way the interaction between institutions and economic development can better 
be captured. In this context, a key question is whether institutional change is one of deliberate 
design or a spontaneous evolutionary process (Kingston & Caballero, 2009) or a combination 
of these. The latter links to another key question, not raised by these authors, namely, 
concerning the synchronicity in or co-evolution of institutional change processes at various 
levels and in public and private domains. Institutional innovation rarely concerns one single 
institution but normally concerns bundles of public and private order institutions created at 
various levels. The literature often gives considerable attention to the State which is to 
provide an appropriate business institutional environment (i.e. set of institutions) within 
which economic agents and activity can prosper and within which private agents can develop 
their own complementary private order institutions. Is this necessarily a downward process 
where public institutions provide the framework within which private order institutions are 
created or adapted? Can the reverse also happen and if so, under what conditions? How do 
national and local level institutional change agents interact? Below we will give some 
conceptual elaborations necessary to answer these questions empirically. 
We will then, in section 2, give a bird’s eye view of the two cases. The first concerns the 
introduction of new beekeeping technologies in the West Nile region of Uganda where a 
private company played a key role in creating an agro-export chain and NGOs a 
complementary one and the other case concerns the introduction of an agro-export crop in the 
Department of La Libertad in Northern Peru by a NGO with a private company as ally. The 
two cases constitute very different cultural and historical institutional settings (the state being 
more prominent in Uganda, than in Peru) but cover roughly the same period (2001 – 2008). In 
both instances the Government attempted to introduce market based agricultural business 
development services (BDS). The purpose of the analysis is not to identify a ‘superior’ 
institution to be replicated elsewhere but to get better insight in what complex set of factors 
and actors shape institutional change around a common institutional need.  
The analysis of the two cases is structured using a time line. Necessarily the presentation of 
the two cases will be sketchy and cannot be elaborated in all their richness for reasons of 
space. Section 3 concludes the paper and examines commonalities and differences between 
the two cases and contains some final observations concerning synchronicity in co-innovation 
processes. 
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Understanding institutional change and co-evolution of institutional innovations 
Institutions are defined in a variety of ways in the literature. A common definition, states that 
institutions are rules of the game (see also Chang (2002). North (1990) maintained that 
institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction and Hodgson 
(1988, 2006) sees them as durable patterns of human interaction. Here we use the notion of 
rules, not as constraints but as rules that guide human behaviour. Nelson sees institutions as 
social technologies or “ways of getting things done when human interaction is needed” 
(Nelson, 2001, 2007). Social technologies become institutions when they have become 
standard and the expected thing to do, given objective and setting (ibid, 2001:40). The 
literature identifies different kinds of institutions. The most common distinction is between 
formal and informal institutions where the former are often associated with written rules. A 
partially overlapping distinction states that specialised actors or organizations (including 
judges and courts) enforce formal institutions (like laws). Informal ones are endogenously 
enforced by members of the associated group (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). Institutions may 
be voluntary and constitute a private order, while public institutions are normally apply to all 
citizens or functional groups within a designated jurisdiction or functional area.  
Institutions tend to be nested and hierarchical. ‘Nestedness’ refers the fact that institutions are 
interrelated and that institutions at one level, set the stage for institutions at another level. For 
example, Williamson (2000) identifies four types of institutions where the time horizon of 
change is taken as a key criterion: i) institutions of embeddedness, including informal 
institutions and norms, change in the order of centuries or millennia; ii) high level formal 
rules such as constitutions, laws and property rights normally change in the order of decades; 
iii) institutions of governance set the rules for day-to-day interactions and can be modified in 
the short run; finally, iv) transaction contracts, which set prices and quantities, change 
continuously. New institutional economists do not study type ‘i’ institutions but take them for 
granted. They focus on level ‘ii’ and ‘iii’ institutions.  
Embeddedness of institutions operates in two ways: it implies that for operational rules, 
higher level rules can be taken as given or as exogenous; but also that for changing 
operational rules it may be necessary to change also higher level rules. This is one of the 
causes of institutional path dependence or inertia (see below). The ‘nestedness’ also explains 
hierarchy between different kinds of institutions, but there is also hierarchy between rules of 
the same kind. The constitution takes precedence over any other law but also some laws take 
precedence over other laws (e.g. criminal over commercial law or children rights over 
employer rights). The hierarchy of rules is one of the important issues of struggle between 
groups who stand to gain or loose from particular rules (Chang, 2002). 
One aspect of hierarchy concerns the scale at which an institution applies. Does it refer to all 
economic agents or to (self-) selected groups? Do agents have alternative options to deal with 
a similar institutional need? In some theoretical approaches the process by which the scale of 
institution rises, is called ‘climbing the institutional ladder’ (see below). 
What drives institutions to change? North (2005) places emphasis on the advances of 
cognitive science or the ways in which we interpret the world and its problems. Hodgson, 
(2006) and Gomez (2008) assume that an institutional gap emerges as a result of endogenous 
or exogenous shocks. That is to say, “when action X does not result in expected outcome Y”. 
Other authors like Nelson (2001, 2002) see technology as the principal driver of institutional 
change. A new physical technology (i.e. new ways of producing, new products or new ways 
of undertaking activities) calls for a change in (internal) routines within the firm and may call 
for a change in ways of doing things between economic agents (institutions). Nelson thus 
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stresses the importance of co-innovation (in technology, organisation, marketing, etc.) and by 
implication institutional innovations in various domains.  
If we follow this reasoning then institutional change involves various actors. The literature 
puts emphasis on two categories of actors, from two different domains: one is the catalytic or 
institutional entrepreneur who acts on his/her own account or in association with other 
entrepreneurs who face similar institutional needs. They may form an association and pursue 
their institutional interests collectively. The second actor is the state. Some authors stress the 
‘embedded autonomy’ of the state to design new institutions through deliberate economic 
policy (Evans, 1995). Conceptions of state vary, as does the emphasis on specific state actors 
and aspects of state functioning and performance. Some authors distinguish between roles of 
state bureaucrats and/or politicians in the institutional design process. With regard to late 
developing countries, we could add multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, which influence 
the direction of institutional change. Others stress the interaction between the public and the 
private domains. The State not only plays a role in terms of designing and enforcing public 
institutions but it also provides legitimacy to private order institutions. Economic interest 
groups struggle for power to control the state and in that way influence the direction of 
institutional change (Chang, 2002).  
New Institutional Economics (NIE) has made important contributions to the economic 
dimension of institutional change (Williamson, 1975, 2000). It is argued that under conditions 
of competitive markets durable institutional change occurs only when the new institution is 
efficient. Institutional options that result in fewer transaction cost reductions will eventually 
give way as being inefficient. At the micro level, NIE also points to the importance of asset 
specificities, information asymmetries, adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which 
trigger specific institutional designs. In many late developing countries markets are far from 
perfect; thin markets and market failures may be endemic and therefore such problems are far 
more frequent and as a result inefficient institutions may continue to abound.  
As regards the sustainability of institutions, two perspectives tend to predominate. One 
emphasizes the existence of competing institutional options and the voluntary nature of 
acceptance and replication. The instigator of a new rule may have to compensate others who 
may stand to loose from the new rule in order to prevent their opposition or their switching to 
another institutional alternative. The other stresses the role of the state and public enforcement 
of compliance. In this case the cost of enforcement is often not seen as an overriding 
consideration, as it remains hidden in overall cost of government but it does imply that 
administrative and public policy considerations may have considerable bearing on 
institutional design process. Bureaucrats may have a different view of the world than do 
entrepreneurs or politicians.  
Institutional change is a path dependent process. Two important factors are situated bounded 
rationality of the actors and institutional inertia. Situated bounded rationality occurs, as 
learning and search processes are localised, time consuming and costly; as a result, 
information tends to be incomplete and processing capacity is limited. Actors therefore reveal 
satisficing behaviour. They will accept a ‘good enough’ institutional option. Risk aversion in 
situations of low trust and failing markets can further compound the selection process and 
prevent institutional change from becoming sustainable. North (2005) stressed the importance 
of mental models and ideologies with which actors work and which can influence the 
perceptions about the effects of alternative institutions. Institutional inertia can result due to 
the existence of free rider problems, which prevent collective action to change institutions. 
Furthermore, informal institutions can be an important source of institutional inertia. Last but 
not least institutional complementarities or interrelatedness can act as a severe brake on 
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institutional change. Not only in functional terms but also because certain groups who benefit 
from the complementary institution can oppose the institutional change desired by others. In 
all, history or context plays an important role in the process of institutional change.  
Brouseau & Raynaud (2007) have made an interesting contribution to the analysis of 
institutional change processes. They argue that institutional change begins as decentralised 
process of creating localised institutional orders. Local institutions tend to be voluntary as 
agents have always the option to create or join alternative institutional solutions to their 
common coordination need. Local institutional orders are therefore in competition with each 
other. They argue that at the local level economic competition takes place between different 
and alternative institutional options but at higher and more centralised level political 
competition between higher order institutions takes precedence. Their central contention is 
that local institutional arrangements have a built in tendency to seek to expand and ‘climb the 
institutional ladder’ and ‘like lava, have the tendency to spread out and then solidify to 
become part of the institutional framework’. When competing, agents can deploy different 
strategies. They can adapt and improve the quality of the institution so as to improve its 
efficiency and relevance to others; poach of go-betweens (that is, agents that ascribe to a rival 
institutional order but with coordination needs that are close to one’s own); manipulate 
switching costs, by making it less attractive for existing members to defect; retaliate ex-post 
and ostracize defectors; and lastly, negotiate a merger (Brouseau & Raynaud, ibid). Timing 
and ‘first mover’ advantages thus play an important role in the process of institutional change  
The nature of the relationships between public and private actors constitutes a key aspect in 
the synchronization of institutional change processes. Do higher public order institutions 
(have to) precede the creation of private order institutions? Alternatively, do private order 
institutions ‘climb the institutional ladder’ as Brouseau & Raynaud suggest and/or demand or 
give rise to required complementary new public institutions, as Chang argues? Or do these 
two public and private institutional innovation processes take place simultaneously? Is the 
synchrony a matter of deliberate coordination between levels and domains or is it a matter of 
chance as their respective path dependent processes co-evolve?    
We began with two main questions: Can institutional change best be seen as spontaneous 
rather than an outcome of deliberate design or as a combination of these two; and, if 
institutional change is about a complex set of institutions co-evolving at different levels and in 
different domains, what influences the co-innovation of institutions? We have elaborated 
above concepts that can help us answer these questions empirically.  
 
2 Bird’s eye views of two case studies 
Introduction 
The two case studies have been monitored over a period of time and the analysis is based on 
multiple site visits. Both authors were involved in the Uganda beekeeping case. Initially Bert 
Helmsing got acquainted with the case while doing evaluation research in the West Nile 
region. Wilson Enzama, a local government official of the Arua District, undertook detailed 
fieldwork in 2008 in the context of the preparation of a research paper, which is part of the 
requirements of an MA in Development Studies at ISS/EUR. Bert Helmsing supervised this 
fieldwork, which had additional small follow-ups in 2009 and 2010. Helmsing is exclusively 
responsible for the Peruvian Asparagus case for which he undertook fieldwork in the North of 
Peru during 2006 and 2008 and archival research at the Cordaid head office in The Hague in 
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2008. He stayed in contact with the principal protagonists in Peru during the past few years. 
In both cases both chain actors (including small farmer groups) and chain promoters have 
been interviewed. 
Institutional arrangements for beekeeping in West Nile, Uganda 
In the nineteen seventies and early eighties Uganda suffered from considerable political 
turmoil and economic mismanagement but with the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of 
Museveni taking control, the economy rebounded and political stability improved. The 
average annual rate of growth in the nineties was 6%. The population below the poverty line 
declined from 56% in 1992 to 38% in 2003. But in Northern Uganda unrest was not contained 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF II) in 
West Nile continued to create havoc. Only in 2002 the Government signed a peace treaty with 
UNRF II rebel groups and post-war reconstruction began in West Nile. 
In 2000 the Government of Uganda launched an ambitious new Policy for the Modernization 
of Agriculture (PMA) to enhance production, competitiveness and incomes. One of the seven 
pillars of the reform was the delivery of agricultural extension through a new National 
Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). NAADS is considered to be an innovative public-
private extension service delivery approach with the aim to increase commercial farming 
among Uganda’s subsistence smallholders. This program was officially launched in 2001 to 
promote the development of farmer organizations and empower them to i) procure advisory 
services; ii) to manage linkages with marketing partners and iii) to conduct demand driven 
monitoring and evaluation of advisory services and their impacts. 
Under the NAADS policy, farmers can form groups, negotiate with private sector (on NGOs) 
service providers, and award short-term contracts to promote specific farm enterprises and 
provide advisory services (Benin, 2007). NAADS implements and manages its program at the 
sub-county (LC3) level. At this level, priority farm products are identified and NAADS 
manages from here the allocation of contracts, monitors and evaluates performance and 
accountability of service providers and farmer groups. At LC3 level farmer forums are 
established, composed of representatives of farmer groups, which themselves operate at 
village level (LC1). The farmer groups are the basic unit receiving the advisory services. 
Members are selected from among the economically active poor (i.e. neither the destitute poor 
nor larger scale farmers). They are encouraged to work together around a particular crop or 
farm enterprise. The farmer groups are given advice on how to organize themselves and 
engage in collective action (e.g. learning how to set themselves up as a farmer group with a 
constitution and how to make bye-laws, etc.), engage the local government and service 
providers, manage technical development sites and organize demonstration and training 
sessions.  
Arua District in West Nile (Northern Uganda) was one of the six ‘trail blazing’ districts in 
which the NAADS program was initiated in 2001. It was rolled out in 24 sub-counties of 
these six districts. In 2002/3 the program was extended to 10 additional districts and in 2003/4 
and 2004/5 another 13 districts were incorporated. In 2005 NAADS was active in 29 (of the 
then total of 70) districts and 280 sub-counties with some 13,200 operating farmer groups 
(Benin, 2007). In West Nile beekeeping was selected as a promising farm enterprise alongside 
with the introduction of a new breed of goats and a new groundnut variety. Table 1 below 
provides an overview. 
Beekeeping has since long been a traditional subsistence activity, especially in the highlands 
of West Nile. The activity was still rudimentary and largely unexploited as a farm enterprise. 
Mostly it took place in the form of gathering wild honey from caves, trees and anthills as part 
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of collective socio-cultural activities of many communities in the region. Local self-made 
beehives were small and made of one piece and were often poorly sited. Wild honey gathering 
consisted of burning the natural colony if one suspected there to be sufficient honey, 
something, which disrupts or may destroy the bee colony. The honey then often contained 
traces of burnt materials and the smell of burnt bees and ashes. Honey was extracted from the 
comb by squeezing it with a cloth, without control of moisture. Others boiled the comb, 
altering the chemical composition of the honey. Honey was kept in small sized containers and 
cans. As a result productivity and quality of honey and beeswax was low and attracted low 
prices.  
Table 1 
Timeline of events in West Nile 
Year Event 
1997 Local governments assume responsibility for agricultural extension services;  
staff transferred from national level to the districts  
2000 Policy for the modernization of Agriculture 
2001 National Agency for Agricultural Extension 
2001 Initiation of NAADS in Six ‘trail blazing’ districts, including Arua 
2002 Bee Natural Products Ltd founded in Kampala 
2002 Comb honey processing plant opened by BNP Ltd in Arua 
2002 Peace Accord signed for Northern Uganda 
2003/5 NAADS expands operations in 13 additional districts 
2003 UNIDO begin beekeeping project for ex-combatants 
2003 Agreement between NAADS and BNP Ltd 
2005 Ugandan Honey certified for EU market 
2007  Second agreement between NAADS and BNP Ltd 
2008 Factory in Arua closed 
2008 New processor starts in Yumbe 
2009 Factory in Arua taken over by Bee Natural Uganda Ltd and reopened with new management 
  Source: compiled from Enzama (2008) and interviews in 2010 
 
But beekeeping had considerable potential to introduce new technology, raise productivity in 
beekeeping and improve the quality of the honey. Firstly there was considerable local and 
external demand for honey; secondly, the investment and operational costs of beekeeping is 
relatively low. It can thrive on marginal and infertile land that cannot support crop cultivation, 
as long as foliage is available. Other inputs (protective gear and equipment) can be shared 
with other beekeepers. As upfront costs are low, a farmer can break even within a year if good 
management practices are adopted. Beekeeping has limited vulnerability to disease and 
natural calamities; moreover it improves crop pollination and is an environmentally sound 
investment. Last but not least, it is not a physically strenuous exercise and youth as well as 
elderly, men as well as women can do it. It is a part time and seasonal activity where 
harvesting takes place twice a year. 
When NAADS canvassed the selected sub-counties in 2001, there were an estimated 1,000 
households scattered throughout the region regularly undertaking beekeeping activities. The 
formation and capacity building of farmer groups was the first challenge of institutional 
development. This was contracted out to NGOs. In 2001 the District Government of Arua, 
NAADS and two NGO signed a memorandum of understanding for the purpose of formation 
and training of farmer groups. 
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Institutional change was needed and clearly associated with the introduction of new physical 
technologies of bee keeping, new farm level routines or practices. In addition new 
complementary institutional arrangements or ‘social technologies’ (Nelson, 2007) had to be 
designed to organize farmer groups and networks with other chain actors, with the purpose to 
impart knowledge and skills, jointly manage equipment, get access to micro-credit and 
eventually undertake group marketing.  
The program soon ran into problems. Agricultural training institutions in Uganda did not offer 
course and expertise in beekeeping and related disciplines. In the whole of East Africa there 
was only one such institution in Tanzania. District entomologists stepped in to provide some 
technical assistance. NGOs had expertise and track records in capacity building in community 
groups and could engage farmers and provide capacity building in setting up and self 
management of farmer groups, but were ill-equipped for specialist BDS in beekeeping.  
Beekeeping is more developed in the relatively affluent central and western regions of 
Uganda. The Uganda National Apiculture Development Organization, a business interest 
association, draws most of its members from here. At that time, Mrs Maria Odido was its 
chairperson. She had taken a keen interest in the development of PMA and of NAADS and 
recognized their potentials. In 2002 she established a private limited company together with 
Mr Antonio Di Fonzo called Bee Natural Products Ltd (BNP) in Kampala. In the same year 
she took samples of West Nile honey to an auction in The Netherlands where it was rated 
second to Brazilian honey in terms of quality.  
The demand perspective for honey was generally considered rather positive both domestically 
and abroad. West Nile produces organic honey, which could potentially penetrate the fast 
growing demand for organic honey in Europe (Loon & Koekoek, 2006 quoted by Enzama, 
2008). In 2005 honey from Uganda was certified for export to the EU. Entering this market 
offered huge opportunities but also enormous challenges. After all, it implied developing a 
substantial agro-export chain, which would have to handle considerable volumes in order to 
become sustainable.  
So, if demand conditions were favourable, a chain coordinator was needed that would be 
capable to organize this new export chain. In 2002, BNP Ltd made a first step in this direction 
by setting up a honey processing plant in West Nile, located in Arua. This plant had an 
installed annual capacity of 600 metric tons. BNP aimed to produce honey and beeswax 
finished and labelled to international standards and ready for the consumer market. But setting 
up a continuous supply chain of quality organic honey for a plant of 600 metric tons is quite 
something else than creating farmer groups to be endowed with new technology and skills to 
produce better quality honey.  
In October 2003 BNP and NAADS signed an agreement whereby BNP would assist in 
implementing the action plans of beekeeping farmer groups. The goal of the agreement was to 
speed up the adoption of improved technology by beekeepers to increase honey productivity 
and sales so as to diversify sources of household cash income. At the same time, the 
agreement served BNP to create its own network of suppliers of comb honey. Concretely 
BNP was to a) facilitate formation and strengthening of beekeepers associations (of beekeeper 
groups) for organized production and collective access to inputs and product markets; b) offer 
extension services for commercial beekeeping; c) introduce new technologies and beekeeping 
practices, notably better yielding and long lasting bee hives and harvesting gear and 
equipment; and, d) to buy the comb honey produced while beekeepers would reciprocate by 
selling their comb honey to BNP.  
The first beneficiaries were 42 beekeeper groups in Arua. Groups in other districts were later 
incorporated into the agreement, covering about 5 groups per sub-county out of an average of 
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20 groups. The cost of the contract was equivalent to € 40,890.00 which was meant to cover 
costs of training artisans to make ‘improved technology’ beehives, extension service, 
distribution of beehives and demonstrations. This fund was managed by the NAADS 
secretariat.  
The formation of beekeeper groups (as a social technology) was for NAADS primarily 
motivated by the need to reduce the costs of transferring knowledge about improved 
technologies and associated farm practices within the desired framework of a market for 
agricultural BDS. For BNP however the beekeeper groups were critical for the development 
of its own supply chain, ensuring continuous high quality supplies of honeycomb and 
reducing logistic and transaction costs. By investing in the relations with beekeeping groups 
and assisting NAADS with tasks, BNP expected to build up trust with beekeepers for future 
buyer-supplier relations. 
Where NGOs were limited to organize farmer groups, BNP could continue imparting skills 
and technology, and train beekeeping groups in joint marketing, joint management of 
equipment and of demonstration sites. The formation of associations of beekeeping groups 
was important for BNP. This higher level of self-organization of beekeepers would reduce the 
complexity of supply chain management for BNP. This however turned out to be much more 
difficult than originally foreseen. Joint sales managed by the associations would demand a 
more complex and transparent management system of accounting for group and individual 
contributions. Furthermore, associations would also become a stronger party negotiating 
contracts with BNP. Last but not least the associations required a high level of trust among 
farmers and farmer groups.  
The improved technology centred on the use of a new type of beehive. Under the agreement, 
the Kenyan Top Bar (KTB) hive was introduced and popularized in the region to replace the 
traditional log hives. BNP set up two apiary technology demonstration and trial sites in each 
of the 12 participating sub-counties to demonstrate the use of the KTB hive for improved 
production. BNP introduced to the use of smokers for harvesting. Producers now also wear 
protective gears, gloves, and gumboots during harvesting. In this way, not only the quality of 
honey is improved but also the quantity that is harvested from one hive rises.  
At the time of the agreement in 2003, the beehives were imported from Kenya and brought in 
from Kampala. This was not only time consuming and costly. At the initiative of BNP, five 
artisans were trained and equipped by BNP with tools and machinery to produce hives 
locally. As a result, in Arua alone, the trained artisans have established three workshops and 
employ over 30 workers. The region no longer imports hives. Business for these workshops is 
set to improve with the neighbouring Sudan and Congo placing orders for hives from West 
Nile.  
Much as the high price is conducive for the young artisans to increase their earnings from the 
sale of hives, many smallholders cannot afford hives. Micro-credit is still hard to access for 
agriculture and related activities from financial institutions. In order to cope with this 
financial market failure, BNP started making agreements with individual farmers to distribute 
beehives to them and deducting the cost from the payment for honey over a period of two to 
three years.  
BNP advisory services involved imparting apiary management techniques and production 
knowledge: how to locate good apiary sites, baiting of bees and techniques of determining the 
readiness of the honey for harvest, how to maintain apiary site to avoid infections and threats 
of ants, lizards and snakes; etc. The field officers of BNP paid regular visits to the apiaries to 
demonstrate the skills learned in theory and for purpose of comb inspection and quality 
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checks. In this way, BNP was able to trace and control the quality of the production process 
right from apiary to the factory.  
A common problem in beekeeping in West Nile was the low colonization rate of beehives, 
which stood at only 60%. As more hives were being introduced, queen rearing became the 
answer to raise the colonization rate. In 2007 the second agreement was signed between 
NAADs and BNP, which apart from up-scaling the previous activities now also included the 
setting up of demonstration sites for queen rearing. This agreement involved a total of 
€73,293 of which 12.8% was an in-kind contribution from BNP as part of their normal 
interventions and as a lead firm of the export chain. The remainder came from the NAADS 
programme. This activity had difficulty getting off the ground due to the lack of BNP 
manpower with the requisite skills. 
BNP constituted the primary link to the market: It was expected that BNP would buy all the 
honey from the producers. Likewise, producers were expected to sell their honey to BNP in 
exchange for the support offered in terms of inputs, technology, training and upgrading of 
products. A win-win situation was envisaged: the farmers would benefit from a ready and 
predictable market for their honey, reduced transaction costs, while BNP increased its assured 
sources of quality comb honey. This complex institutional arrangement can be classified as an 
informal relational contract. 
Initially, farmers were happy and expectant with this arrangement because BNP was seen as a 
credible registered firm, with a location in the region, recognized by government and 
providing opportunities for acquisition of new and improved technologies and practices. 
However, the beekeepers were not party in the agreement between NAADS and BNP. 
Moreover the agreement was silent on quality standards, price and delivery arrangements. The 
grading of the quality of honey was set and done by BNP at the factory and in absence of the 
producers. There were basically two grades of honey (A and B) according to moisture 
content, colour and scent. Furthermore, BNP tended to offer lower prices than other traders, 
which is something the company justified on the grounds of the subsidies in kind in the form 
of technical assistance, and implied financial costs of providing beehives with deferred re-
payment.  
Initially BNP paid promptly, but as the supply chain became more extensive and complex, 
payments delayed two weeks or more, while other travelling traders paid cash on delivery. 
Side selling by beekeepers increased as more traders visited Arua, attracted by its growing 
supply base. As side selling increased it became uneconomical for BNP to send out its truck 
to collect smaller quantities of honey from distant locations and effectively the spatial range 
of the supply chain shrank and with it the production supply base. By 2007 the factory was 
operating at not more than 25% of its capacity. Overhead costs rose, reducing further the 
ability of BNP to raise producer prices. 
Clearly non-core activities had started to overwhelm BNP. Not only the number of farmer 
groups embracing apiculture rose rapidly, but also the number of activities undertaken by 
BNP to support the expansion and deepening of the honey supply base increased: from 
technical advice and training of beekeepers, co-financing the local production of beehives and 
their distribution, queen rearing and setting up the supply chain for processing and sale of 
honey and beeswax in domestic and export markets. With only two extension staff the quality 
of its service started to decline and eventually stopped in 2005.  
The company was also hit by high turnover of staff. The employees complained of poor pay 
and terms of service and the director of BNP accused the employees of cheating the company 
and not accounting for some company funds. Employees who were fired became rival traders 
in honey. Consistency and continuity of service delivery to the beekeepers was thus 
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undermined. The trust which BNP had started to build up with beekeepers, rapidly eroded. In 
2008 the company decided to close down the factory as processed volumes had become 
uneconomical. Later on, in 2009 the processing plant in Arua was re-opened under new 
ownership and management and it is set to re-develop supplier relationships and re-gain 
beekeeper’s loyalty. 
What were the effects of the disruption of the BNP value chain on beekeeping in West Nile in 
2008? Clearly BNP could not continue to remain a de-facto monopsonist controlling the 
entire value chain. Beekeepers became disloyal as evidenced by rapid rise of side selling and 
by BNP’s inability to enforce the informal institutional arrangements with local beekeepers 
groups. Even beekeepers, who had obtained beehives from BNP were side selling and 
claimed that they could not deliver honey to BNP and thereby repay their loans in kind. 
Clearly, BNP suffered from own management problems as evidenced by a lack of effective 
costing and contracting of non-core activities with beekeepers (and with which it had no prior 
experiences), lack of transparent quality assessment and pricing and the inability to manage 
the expanding supply chain as evidenced by increasing delays in payments and declining 
levels of service delivery. Supplier loyalty was high at initial stages as the benefits in the form 
of free services were visible and highly appreciated but declined later on as prices became a 
contentious issue and switching to the alternative option of side selling became easier to 
realize as more traders visited the area. 
Furthermore, other actors introduced different technologies and alternative institutional 
arrangements to the region. Firstly, UNIDO developed a project in West Nile to promote 
beekeeping, small-scale processing of honey and marketing under arms length market 
arrangements for ex-combatants of defunct rebel groups. Secondly SNV, a Dutch 
development organization, which focused on larger beekeepers associations and provided 
organizational capacity building and facilitated links with credible (but mostly non-profit) 
organizations providing tailor made technical, logistical, market and financial support to 
expand the supported association’s operations. SNV has supported 127 groups in the 
neighbouring Moyo District and the Netherlands Embassy subsidized beehives and 
equipment. Thirdly, enterprising beekeepers started investing in forward integration at a small 
scale. By starting their own small scale processing units, they undercut BNP while benefitting 
from the development of the improved technologies and production services among 
beekeepers. One example is the company “Bee for Life” in the nearby Yumbe district, which 
buys honey from some 500 beekeepers. 
As BNP no longer met the advisory and technology needs of the growing number of 
beekeepers, the local governments in the region through the NAADS started to expand 
contracts to private service providers to offer supplementary advisory and technology 
development services to fill the gap. By end of 2004, graduates from Nyabea Training Centre 
in Masindi, with elementary certificates in apiculture expanded the supply of advisory 
services in the region. By 2007 some 37 of these graduates were awarded contracts to support 
the beekeeper groups with advisory services and technology development. The dependence on 
BNP as a provider of key technological services declined.  
What have been the overall local development results? The sector has experienced steady 
increase in the number of beekeepers from about 1,000 in 2002, before the agreement, to 
4,000 in 2005 and over 6,300 in 2007. Idle resources like land, unsuitable for crop cultivation, 
has been put to use as apiary sites. Youth, majority of whom do not own and control land, is 
able to participate in the industry and also elderly members of the community who were 
unable to engage in crop agriculture could stay active in apiculture. The industry has created 
dynamism in the West Nile economy. Backwards and forward linkages have been developed. 
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The local artisans who are making beehives and tailors who make protective wears have 
created opportunities for raw material input dealers. Additional processors set up operations 
and new traders arrived. BNP has also extended the honey chain to global markets, albeit 
temporarily. Beekeepers have gone back to the domestic arms-length market relations due to 
attractive domestic prices, incomplete contracts and lack of trust. 
Institutional change for smallholder participation in export-agriculture in Northern Peru 
The origins of our case can be traced back a Jesuit priest Jose de Bernardi, who developed the 
ideas concerning the creation of the Centre for Transfer of Technologies to University 
graduates (CTTU). Table 2 below presents a time line of the main events of CTTU and its 
activities (Helmsing, 2009). The CTTU targeted graduates of the regional universities and 
provided them with the opportunity to become young entrepreneurs forming their own agro-
enterprise, dedicated to the growing of a high value export crop - asparagus. The intervention 
logic was primarily justified on political grounds: how to prevent that frustrated university 
graduates join the terrorist movements and instead of “promoters of violence” become 
“promoters of peace”. However its application was primarily economic: how to form 
entrepreneurs and incubate their enterprises.  
 
Table 2 
Timeline of events in La Libertad, Peru 
1990 Principal protagonist meets leading entrepreneur: a learning alliance is formed 
1991 Creation of CTTU, Centre for Transfer of Technology to University Graduates 
1993 CEBEMO (later named CordAid) approves the CTTU project for funding (1993-1995) 
1993 Acquisition of the land holding ‘San Juan’ from the CHAVIMOCHIC project (25 has) 
1993-5 Promotion of first  cohort of (12) young entrepreneurs – DIPU “San Juan”, Moche 
1994 CTTU itself is legally constituted as ‘non-profit socio-cultural association’ 
1995 First promotion of Gravity Irrigation Producer Association, GIPA groups (5) in Chao and Virú 
1995 Second promotion of (10) young entrepreneurs – DIPU “San Martin”, Moche 
1996 CEBEMO agreed to finance a second project phase (1996-1998) 
1996 Agreement with Community of Paijan – CTTU acquires 100 has of communally held desert land 
1997 Third promotion of (12) young entrepreneurs – DIPU “San Jose”, Paijan 
1997 CTTU creates an agricultural enterprise “Casuarinas”, Moche  
1998/9 Serious damages by heavy rains caused by “El Niño” and a drop in asparagus yields 
1999 CordAid agreed to finance a third project phase (1999-2001) 
1999 CTTU starts a parallel integrated local development project in Paijan, financed by Action Aid 
1999 Fourth promotion of (10) young entrepreneurs, DIPU “San Ignacio de Loyola”, Paijan 
1999 DIPU San Juan creates a Limited Company called “Agro San Juan SAC”  
1999/00 Four new GIPA groups are formed in Paijan; two GIPAs formed 1988 close down  
2000 Asparagus price drops in the international market (price war initiated by China) 
2001 Formation of six new GIPA groups in Paijan; two GIPAs of 2000 close down 
2000/1 Export boom becomes a bust: falling international prices 
2001 Drop in GIPAs (2) and GIPA membership (95) in Virú, Chao and Chimbote 
2001 Government policy to create a plural and competitive system of agricultural BDS 
2003 Governing Board CTTU: CTTU to withdraw from credit operations 
2003 DIPU San Jose, Paijan creates limited company called “Agro Lider SAP SAC” 
2004 CTTU secures two government funded projects providing BDS services and chain coordination to 
contract farmers  
2005/6 New model replicated among small producers and companies 
2007 Financial institutions accept CTTU model for group loans for export agriculture finance scheme 
Sources: Field interviews and internal documents CTTU 
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Crucial in the germination of his ideas was a chance encounter in 1990 between De Bernardi 
and the owner/manager of an innovative firm, TAL S.A. In 1991 the CTTU was created. 
Additional resources were subsequently obtained from a Dutch co-financing agency, which 
enabled it to expand staff and actually start its activities.  
A first land holding was acquired on desert land to begin incubation of agro-enterprises using 
advanced technology and farm management methods, developed with the ‘foster enterprise’ 
(TAL S.A.). Drip irrigation technology, which was new to Peru, required a minimum scale of 
operation in order to be economically viable. Single person enterprises envisaged as part of 
the incubation process were too small. This problem could be addressed by creating a 
cooperative in which irrigation assets would be pooled. But since the collapse of the agrarian 
reform, cooperatives had a ‘bad reputation’. Therefore CTTU choose another collective 
solution well known to its staff and existing in Peruvian civil law: a non-profit ‘welfare 
organization’. This became the Drip Irrigation Production Unit (DIPU), which legally owned 
the irrigation infrastructure, serving 15 to 25 one-hectare single person enterprises. The first 
DIPU started operations in 1995 with 12 university graduates after a long struggle to locate 
underground water for irrigation. It achieved spectacular yields much higher than large-scale 
agro-companies in the region.  
As the fame of the project spread to peasant communities in the valleys of the Department, 
these began to pressure the CTTU ‘not to abandon them’. Resource conditions on peasant 
smallholdings however did not permit drip irrigation and technological constraints led to a 
complementary institutional adaptation. The Gravity Irrigation Producers Association (GIPA) 
was a new institutional arrangements created in 1995. This institutional arrangement does not 
own any assets but organises selected groups of young rural higher education graduates for 
learning, input distribution and group marketing. In the second half of the nineties a number 
of GIPAs were created in the valleys of Chao, Virú and Chimbote. 
A mayor breakthrough in addressing the land constraint to incubate advanced technology 
enterprises (DIPUs) was the ‘acquisition’ of 100 hectares of desert land owned by the 
community of Paijan (in the North of the Department of La Libertad) on the condition that 
CTTU would stimulate enterprise development in DIPUs and GIPAs in the Paijan district. 
Faced with market failure in the credit market, credit then became the most binding 
constraint. CTTU addressed this by assuming responsibility for a large loan obtained from the 
Canadian Counter Value Fund. The number of DIPUs and especially GIPAs increased 
rapidly. In order to serve the new enterprises with high yielding varieties, CTTU set up its 
own nursery in 1997 where it produces seedlings under controlled conditions. Seedlings were 
provided as a service, free of charge, to DIPU and GIPA members. 
The asparagus export boom in the region received a big stimulus with completion of the 
CHAVIMOCHIC project. The state sold by public tender nine thousand hectares of dessert 
land alongside a newly constructed irrigation channel to large companies, many of which 
invested directly in asparagus production. As a result, the region became a leading exporter. 
The asparagus boom attracted also related and supporting industries and service providers 
(input distributors, sale and hire of farm equipment etc.) as well as rural labour that migrated 
from the peasant community highlands of the Andes to work the fields in this coastal region. 
Within a period of five years a new regional export base developed around one single crop, 
asparagus.  
In 1999 CTTU applied again to the Dutch co-financing agency for financial support for a 
third period. Also this third application is successful. The number of applicants to CTTU 
grew, attracted by the high incomes earned in the export activities. The relative resource 
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abundance of CTTU in those years resulted in less strict selection by CTTU of potential 
entrepreneurs.  
In 1998/9 the “El Niño” phenomenon struck causing heavy rains and flooding in the valleys 
resulting in damages to irrigated fields. Crop yields declined in GIPAs in these valleys but 
DIPUs situated in the desert were not affected. Before small farmers could recoup their losses, 
an aggressive Chinese export drive in the world market led in 2000/1 to a fall in asparagus 
world prices. The number of GIPAs as well as GIPA membership declined rapidly. Members 
defaulted on their loans and left the CTTU with their accumulated debts. The growth of 
DIPUs also stagnated as economic prospects had declined.  
The institutional change agent, CTTU, suddenly found itself in crisis. Thanks to ‘bridging 
finance from Cordaid, CTTU could engage in extensive consultations with its principal 
stakeholders and producer groups. The new institutional choices made by CTTU were 
influenced by three main factors: i) important changes in the broader institutional 
environment, notably a new agricultural policy of the Peruvian government, which created 
new opportunities for CTTU based on its acquired reputation, ii) the response of Peruvian 
export firms to the competitive challenge of China, and iii) the vision of the CTTU about its 
own future role.  
The World Bank sponsored INCAGRO project signified an important change in Peru’s 
agricultural policy. Its aim was to create a market for business development services for 
commercial agriculture whereby private firms and NGOs provide extension services to groups 
of producers, which were co-financed by the Government. At the same time the Peruvian 
Government created so-called ‘second tier’ funds to finance the expansion of commercial 
agriculture. The INCAGRO project was a national scheme to which (independent) groups of 
agro-producers could apply often in association with agro-industry. Thanks to its accumulated 
experience and reputation, CTTU could organize groups of producers and team up with agro-
industrial firms and could make several successful bids.  
The second factor refers to technological innovations in transport of horticulture exports in 
neighbouring Chile and their adaptation to the Peruvian asparagus (the use of air controlled 
containers extending the fresh life of horticulture products by changing the percentage of 
oxygen) and the extension of this shipping service to Trujillo, Peru. Thanks to these 
technological innovations, the Peruvian firms succeeded to redefine their market niche by 
switching from preserved white asparagus to fresh green asparagus. Since then they have 
become world leader in fresh asparagus, leaving China to dominate the world market of 
preserved (canned) asparagus.  
The technological innovation in production and logistics related to asparagus also made it 
easy to adapt these to other high value export crops. This made it possible for Peruvian firms 
to diversify their export crops. The new export products were annual crops (artichoke, 
peppers etc.) reducing the high risks associated with investment in semi-perennials such as 
asparagus. Based on prior successful collaboration with CTTU, export companies shared their 
learning experiences and on that basis CTTU could relatively quickly adapt training packages 
to the new crops.  
The Government policy of financing commercial agro-export set the terms for the new 
contractual arrangements. Banks would provide credit against the presentation of a contract 
with an agro-export firm. This led to a local adaptation of a contract farming model: CTTU 
became a chain coordinator, providing chain coordination, agricultural extension and related 
business services to small producers. For small producers the CTTU provided “transaction 
opportunities” in markets not accessible to them individually, notably in the markets for 
export crops, for inputs, and for credit. The risks of operating in volatile export markets were 
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managed by means of new interlocking contractual arrangements between CTTU and 
smallholder, between smallholders and export companies and between smallholders and 
banks with CTTU as co-signatory. In this new institutional set up, CTTU became a non-profit 
or social enterprise with a mission to serve small producers but charging for its services.  
How successful has the CTTU been in its original objectives? The results are mixed: the 
original plan of incubation of individual enterprises in combination with a desert land 
colonization scheme, based on the DIPU model was, in the end, not successful. The chosen 
institutional arrangement ‘froze’ the incubation process. The institutional arrangements of a 
welfare organization did not permit unsuccessful members to exit with compensation for their 
past efforts. CTTU has been most successful with the institutional model it had neither 
initially designed nor foreseen. This was the new GIPA model (a combination of collective 
action, contract farming and social enterprise services), creating ‘transaction opportunities’ 
for educated children of the ‘parceleros of the agrarian land reform’ and incubating their new 
enterprises on small plots on former irrigated estates.  
CTTU’s success can be explained by its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, aided 
by long term funding from a ‘patient’ donor, a learning alliance with an innovative private 
firm and by having build up a reputation with large export companies. The very 
transformation of the regional economy created ‘a critical mass’, economically and 
politically. Economically, in so far that the geographical concentration of asparagus 
production attracted specialised suppliers and services to the region from which also small 
producers benefitted and because large firms were able to respond successfully to the 
competitive challenge of China. In political terms in the sense that export business leaders 
from the region were invited to help give shape to the new agricultural policies of the 
Government (INCAGRO project) and because large companies were able to lobby the 
Government for infrastructural improvements (roads and sea- and airport).  
Table 3 below gives an overview of the status in 2008 of all incubatees since 2000. Since its 
re-engineering, the CTTU has selected more than 420 persons for its entrepreneurship and 
enterprise development programme.  
Table 3 
Status in 2008 of CTTU Incubatees since 2000 
 2008 % 
Currently in process of incubation 41 9.7 
Start up enterprise operating in chains coordinated by CTTU 57 13.5 
Start up enterprises operating independently in group based agro-export cultivation 60 14.2 
Employed in the agro-export sector 30 7.1 
Unsuccessful incubation – returned to traditional cultivation 98 23.2 
Unsuccessful incubation – moved into non-agricultural employment 39 9.2 
Unsuccessful incubation – rural – urban migration 14 3.3 
Unsuccessful incubation – due to social reasons (incl. health) 28 6.6 
Other 9 2.1 
Without information  47 11.1 
Total 423 100.0 
Source: registers CTTU, Trujillo, Peru 
 
The table gives an overview of their status in 2008. Of these nearly 10% in that year were 
participating in the programme. Fifty-seven entrepreneurs were engaged in export chains 
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coordinated by CTTU and another sixty were doing so independently from CTTU. Another 
30 persons could find employment in the same sector, thanks to the competences acquired 
through CTTU. In almost one hundred instances, CTTU was unsuccessful. The incubatees, 
after some time, switched back to traditional crop cultivation and farming practices. Then 
there are three categories of what we could characterise as unsuccessful instances as people 
moved out of agriculture altogether, either they migrated, switched to non-agricultural 
occupations or social reasons explained their exit. Then there is a significant group of persons 
(11%) without any information on their whereabouts. 
In order to conclude on the performance, table 4 below defines ‘success’ and ‘failure’ rates. 
Criterion 1 is the strictest definition of success: Have incubatees become independent 
entrepreneurs who now operate their enterprises in agro-export crops on their own or with 
independently formed groups? Using this criterion only 14% of the incubatees of CTTU can 
be considered successful. Criterion 2 recognizes that small farm enterprises face systemic 
market failures and need ‘allies’ who help overcome these. The CTTU performs this role 
through its coordination of the agricultural production segment of agro-export chains. In this 
case the success rate rises to 28%. Criterion 3 has the broadest success definition. For people 
who fail as entrepreneurs but who remain employed within the agro-export chains, one cannot 
conclude that the investment has been a waste of resources. The investments continue to yield 
social benefits. In this case the ‘success rate’ of CTTU rises to 35%.  
We can also look at the performance of CTTU looking at the failure side. As shown in Table 
4, the aggregate failure rate is 42%. That is to say, four out of every 10 persons who 
participated in the CTTU programmes did not form agro-export enterprises or remained active 
in that sector. However, only 2 in 10 reverted back to traditional farming practices. The other 
2 in 10 for various reasons left the agricultural sector completely. This is a general 
characteristic of rural processes of change. It would most likely have happened irrespective of 
the CTTU intervention. In that sense it is a kind of dead weight factor that needs correction in 
the evaluation of the results. Taking this into account it can be concluded that the overall 
CTTU performance can be considered positive indeed.  
Table 4 
 Success and failure of the CTTU driven change process 
 2008 % 
Success   
Criterion 1: independent entrepreneur (without any assistance from CTTU) 60 14.2 
Criterion 2: independent entrepreneur (with or without assistance from CTTU) 117 27.7 
Criterion 3: active in agro-export chains + agricultural employment 147 34.8 
Failure   
Unsuccessful incubation – return to traditional cultivation 98 23.2 
Unsuccessful incubation – other employment (non-agricultural) 39 9.2 
Unsuccessful incubation – rural to urban migration 14 3.3 
Unsuccessful incubation – social factors 28 6.6 
Aggregate rate 179 42.3 
  Source: table 3 
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4 Reflecting on institutional co-innovation 
 
What are the main commonalities among and the main differences between the two cases of 
co-innovation? There are at least four common elements and five main differences in the 
process of institutional co-innovation  
First of all, the key institution itself consisted of the rules concerning the formation of similar 
sized farmer groups (in practice 10-15 members). In both instances the main motivation was 
to achieve economies of scale in capacity building, imparting new skills and practices around 
a new physical technology and farm level practices. The social technology of forming groups, 
for group-based technical assistance, learning and experimentation, was complemented by use 
for group level management of joint assets (experimental stations, irrigation) and joint 
marketing. In both instances, change agents had to overcome market failure in input markets 
(notably finance, but also key inputs such as queen bees and quality seeds) in order to enable 
small farmers to enter the new product market. Both BNP and CTTU undertook micro finance 
lending to enable small farmers to acquire loans to finance the new activity. In both instances, 
the innovative agent nearly collapsed under this weight of these ‘non-core’ activities, which 
aimed to eliminate critical and binding resource constraints of small farmers. 
Secondly, in both instances the initial institution - the farmers group for organizing and 
managing technical assistance - has been adapted to suit the coordination needs of other 
economic agents. In Uganda, BNP Ltd. transformed the farmer groups into a full-fledged 
supply chain institution to be able to export quality honey; in Peru the institution was adapted 
(CTTU ceased forming DIPUs and redefined the GIPAs into a more flexible annual contract 
farming group operating in export chains).  
Thirdly, in both instances the new institution was interlinked with other parallel institutions in 
order to export high value horticultural crops: in Uganda, there were bi-lateral interlocking 
contracts between BNP and contact farmers for purpose of supply chain logistics and with 
beekeepers on distribution of new beehives and on sale of honey; in Peru, the GIPA was the 
basis for multi-lateral interlocking contracts between small farmer groups – CTTU on the one 
hand and agro-export firms and banks on the other hand. In both cases products quality 
standards were key to access international markets. The institutional rules on standards were 
neither negotiated nor independently verified but in both cases defined upfront by the 
dominant buyer(s) of the product: in Uganda BNP itself and in Peru the agro-export firms. In 
Peru there were no collective assets involved in the GIPA. In practice, beekeeper groups in 
West Nile also did not hold collective assets. 
Fourthly, in both instances there were important power asymmetries, which influenced the 
direction of institutional co-innovation. In Uganda BNP was initially a monopsonist and 
effectively tried to turn the beekeeping groups into larger beekeeper associations as key nodes 
in its supply chain; in Peru the agro-export firms were much more powerful than the farmer 
groups as the former were vertically integrated processing firms, producing high value crops 
on their own large-scale farms. But in both instances the market situation strongly influences 
the degree to which power holders could exploit their power advantage. In Uganda, the 
growth of the industry attracted new rival traders and some beekeepers moved forward to 
expand in comb honey processing, thereby opening up new market outlets for other 
beekeepers, undermining the monopoly of BNP and its associated supply chain institutions. 
Arm’s length market arrangements gradually replaced value chain based networks. In Peru the 
agro-export firms continued to dominate the export chains but in global markets they were 
also price takers.  
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Having enumerated the main commonalities, let us now look at the five main differences 
between the two cases. First of all, the products for which new physical and social 
technologies needed to be developed were quite different. Asparagus growing is a full time 
and perennial crop, while beekeeping is a part-time seasonal activity. This has important 
implications for the intensity with which agents ‘live’ by the new institutional arrangements. 
In the one case these concern the primary occupation of the small farmer, while for the other 
they relate to a complementary seasonal and part-time activity. The relative importance of the 
income derived from honey was much smaller than the income generated by asparagus 
growing and so were the risks. Not honouring commitments with BNP had less social 
consequences within the beekeeper communities. In Peru poorly performing small farmers 
were excluded from farmer groups in subsequent rounds. Upfront entry barriers associated 
with the product also differed considerably. Asparagus growing required minimally one 
hectare of irrigated land and access to water (tube-well) and a substantial amount of working 
capital; in beekeeping there was hardly any entry barrier and it required relatively small cash 
outlays. Asparagus growing was new for most small farmers, while beekeeping was a 
traditional practice among many communities in West Nile.  
Secondly, there were important differences in the selection process of small farmers. In 
Uganda’s practice any rural household could participate; only large-scale farmers were 
excluded. In Uganda, the selection process was primarily bureaucratic: the selection of the 
sub-county in which NAADS would operate. In Peru there was a clear and upfront selection 
of young and educated small farmers (initially urban professional university graduates, later 
rural young farmers and graduates of agro-technical institutes). The scale of the process was 
quite different: in Peru the total number of small scale farmers was less than 500 in 2008; in 
Uganda it involved an increase from 1000 in 2001 to 6500 beekeepers in 2008; In Peru the 
same farm level technology and the associated social technology of small farmer groups was 
replicated to other high value export crops (such as paprika, peppers etc.). This was not the 
case in Uganda.  
Thirdly, and as regards actors, there were also important differences. In Uganda, the NGOs 
played only a supportive role. The governmental NAADS programme was the principal 
driver. A commercial firm (BNP Ltd) played a key role in creating and transforming the 
honey value chain adapting and extending thereby the original institutional arrangements. The 
company assumed initially a social entrepreneurial catalytic role but later backtracked as 
financial and human resource implications overwhelmed it, to continue as a purely 
commercial firm. In Peru the NGO (CTTU) was the principal catalyst, which had a 
commercial firm as its ally; in the process the NGO adapted itself to changing financial 
circumstances (the termination of the project subsidy from a Northern NGO donor) and 
became a non-profit but market oriented NGO or social enterprise.  
Fourthly, government policy in Uganda, and specifically the NAADS programme, played a 
fundamental role in shaping the institutional co-innovation; These institutional innovations 
were centrally decided, designed ex-ante and in detail by public officials with strong influence 
of the World Bank and with the aim to create market for technical assistance and to reduce the 
cost of implementing the new policy; Complementary innovations were made locally, by trial 
and error and in a decentralised manner involving other economic agents (BNP). Later on in 
the process, again other agents created locally rival institutional innovations (UNIDO, SNV) 
and rival traders offered arm’s length contracts, thereby increasing the choice for small 
farmers but also undermining the role of beekeeper groups in the production and marketing 
process. In Peru, the CTTU initiated an institutional design process in a manner of trial and 
error, strongly guided by the unfolding technology of irrigated high value export crops 
 21 
growing and adapting its own designs along the way, discontinuing the DIPU and developing 
new and complementary institutional arrangements as the policy environment changed 
favourably with the new government programme of market based technical assistance (in the 
form of the World Bank financed INCAGRO program) and complementary financial policy 
(2nd tier funds for innovative SMEs and commercial small export farming). The Peruvian 
Government policy was not leading but provided an important tipping point in the 
evolutionary change process led by CTTU.  
Fifthly, there are interesting differences as regard the direction of the process. In Peru and 
much in contrast to established NGO doctrine and practices: economic empowerment was 
considered fundamental to be achieved first, and political empowerment of disenfranchised 
groups would come later as an outcome. It should be said that in reality no evidence of the 
latter was found. In Uganda, the political empowerment of small farmers in order to become a 
stronger market party was a central feature of the NAADS policy. Without farmer groups, 
small farmers would not able to become an active player in the market for technical assistance 
and engage private sector (and NGO) suppliers of extension services. In practice however, 
political empowerment also followed economic empowerment: a number of successful men 
and women active in beekeeping in West Nile became sub-county and district level political 
leaders. In Peru the process was initially heavily supply driven: the unfolding technology 
strongly influenced the institutional options that were conceived (the DIPU). But local social 
demands made CTTU to adapt its institutional arrangements by creating the GIPA. Later on 
the new policy environment and the market demanded greater flexibility and the GIPA was 
adapted and farmer groups were formed more flexibly around product specific interlinked 
contracts. In Uganda, institutional adaptations also occurred: the small farmer groups formed 
to change the rules of technical assistance were transformed into supply chain nodes with 
their own specific institutional arrangements. However, the growth of the industry instead of 
consolidating the new institutional arrangements, led to the arrival of rival institutional agents 
and alternative options and in the end to the demise of the BNP institutional monopoly. Side 
selling played a key role: in Uganda BNP contracts were informal and entry of rival agents 
was much easier. This stood in sharp contrast with Peru where side selling was much more 
difficult due to the formal contracts and considerable entry barriers in processing and 
exporting. 
Finally, let us consider the questions formulated at the beginning of this paper. We find in 
both instances strong evidence in favour of institutional co-innovation in different aspects of 
value chain development (in physical and social technologies, organisational innovations for 
learning, joint marketing, contract for quality products between chain actors, with innovations 
in complementary markets for inputs and finance). There is in both instances ‘nestedness’ of 
institutions whereby national public institutions give room for private institutions at the level 
of the chain (respectively level 2 institutions and level 3 institutions as defined by 
Williamson). However this ‘nestedness’ is not always present as is shown by both cases. In 
Uganda the process was top down and preceded value chain development, while in Peru there 
was a certain degree of bottom up creation of nestedness as leading entrepreneurs demanded 
government to support the new export agriculture with institutional innovations in extension 
and finance. These new public policies followed and came for CTTU at the right time. 
Is there a process of ‘climbing the institutional ladder’ as formulated by Brousseau & 
Raynaud suggested, whereby locally generated institutional innovations acquire greater 
acceptability? In the case of Peru this was certainly the case as CTTU initiated institutional 
arrangements became accepted by agro-export firms and banks, but competition between 
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different institutional agents may cause a fall from the institutional ladder, as happened with 
the institutional arrangements instituted by BNP in Uganda.  
While specific innovations may be designed upfront, co-innovation of complementary 
institutional innovations is rarely fully designed upfront but co-innovation implies a certain 
degree of decentralised experimentation. There may be several reasons for this, resource 
constraints among the principal actors (BNP and CTTU) in the face of market failures arising 
from the behaviour of other agents (e.g. in credit markets). But in my view the most important 
constraint on designed co-innovation is ‘situated bounded rationality’. Rarely the principal 
innovation protagonists can foresee all contingencies and considerable ‘on the ground’ 
experimentation is needed to ensure that all complementary and co-evolving innovations 
match.  
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